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During the month of August, 2009 I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center with the 
support of a Grant-in-Aid to conduct research for my dissertation, which examines the 
philanthropic activities of U.S. private foundations in Latin America during the decades of the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.  My project explores how foundation grants and programs aimed to 
modernize Latin American economies and accelerate their integration into a global economy and 
culture.  The goal was not only to come away with an understanding of the types of projects the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF) was involved with but also to examine the ideological assumptions 
behind the projects, to identify any limitations of the foundation’s vision, and to sketch out how 
these limitations altered or changed initial assumptions.  My first venture into the material 
available on development projects in Latin America underscores the complex political 
environment the RF was operating in and reveals how initial assumptions about modernization in 
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Latin America proved simplistic and lacked an understanding of the interrelatedness of social, 
economic, and cultural phenomenon.   
While I was unable to look at all the relevant record groups on this trip (a testament to the 
amount of material available and the helpfulness of the staff in pointing out additional material), 
I did examine Record Group 1.2 (Series 311, 309, 301, 305-project files from Colombia, Brazil, 
Chile, and Argentina), Record Group 12.1 (Officers’ Diaries), Record Group 3.2 (Series 900 - 
Program and Policy), and Record Group 3.1 (Series 910 – Program and Policy -- Social 
Sciences).  As I will detail below, Record Group 1.2 provided me with information about 
specific grants in Latin America, from justifications for the project to reports and problems 
encountered.  One of the more illuminating record groups was RG 12.1, though some of the 
material in these officers’ diaries was also interspersed among the country project files.  The 
diaries offer a revealing look (more so than project files) at how RF officers responded to the 
volatile political atmosphere in various Latin American countries.  Through the record groups 
mentioned, I tried to identify the goals, ideological assumptions, and limitations of RF projects in 
the areas of agriculture, university reform, and population.             
In my previous research at the Ford Foundation and the National Archives I found ample 
evidence of collaboration between the major foundations and U.S. government agencies, so I 
came to the Rockefeller Foundation material with the assumption that they shared with these 
organizations similar goals and outcomes in Latin America.  These goals were based broadly on 
the development paradigm of the day, modernization theory.
1
 Material in the Rockefeller 
Foundation files appears to support this assumption.  For example, the RF’s university 
development program sought the “development of institutions engaged in teaching and research 
to bring about the transition from traditional to modern ways of life, and to enlarge the 
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opportunities available to enhance human welfare.”2  This traditional/modern dichotomy was the 
lens through which the Rockefeller Foundation saw not only its university development 
programs, but also its agriculture and population programs. It also offers an explanation for why 
university development, agriculture and population projects were central to the Foundation’s 
vision of what it wanted to accomplish in Latin America.
3
 
Agriculture in Colombia and Chile 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s agricultural projects in Colombia sprouted from the 
successful foray into modernizing Mexican agriculture during the 1940s and 1950s.
4
  The RF 
sought to expand the Green Revolution to Colombia and Chile during the 1950s and 1960s by 
funding research and agricultural extension programs aimed at increasing food production.  
According to a 1953 RF report, the farming population in Colombia was “ready and anxious to 
accept new ideas and put them to practice.”5  Underlying this interest in Colombia’s agricultural 
productivity were concerns about how high food prices might lead to instability.  Noting this 
concern in his report on Colombia, Herrell DeGraff remarked, “I found myself wondering how 
long a situation could continue in which a half-kilo loaf of bread cost a quarter of a day’s wages 
for an industrial worker before a revolution might grow out of popular disgust and despair.”6   
Increasing  productivity through the introduction of scientific farming methods, new 
technologies, and the establishment of agricultural research centers was seen as the answer to the 
agricultural problem in Colombia, and indeed, throughout the underdeveloped world.  By the late 
1950s, the basic objective of agricultural programs was “the training of local scientists, through 
participation in research projects on basic food crops as well as by means of scholarships and 
fellowships, to the point at which selected individuals take increasing responsibility for 
leadership in agricultural science in their own countries.”7  This transfer of scientific knowledge 
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was the initial solution to the highly politicized issue of agriculture and land in Latin America.  
However, by the 1960s it was clear that merely having the technology and know-how to increase 
crop yield in areas already being cultivated, while a worthwhile endeavor, had not solved the 
“agricultural problem” in Colombia or other countries in Latin America.  In order to make 
further gains, the RF would have to find a way to address the issue of unproductive and idle 
land.
8
    Already, the Rockefeller Foundation along with USAID, the United Nations, American 
universities, the Kellogg Foundation, and the Ford Foundation were cooperating and broadening 
their approach to the agricultural issue in Colombia and beyond by looking at such things as 
credit, storage, and price stability.   
Increasing productivity through scientific research and the application of that research 
was an area the Rockefeller Foundation felt very comfortable with, as it fit within broader 
ideological assumptions about capitalist development and modernization.
9
  However, venturing 
into the issue of land reform would place the Foundation in the middle of a volatile political 
debate.  I found illuminating discussions of land reform and the Foundation’s role in this issue 
among the Chilean projects files and the trip diaries of Charles Hardin.  As land reform in Chile 
became a much debated political issue in the early 1960s, the Rockefeller Foundation, which 
already had agricultural programs operating in the country, seemed reluctant to get involved in 
land reform projects.  In 1960 Albert H. Moseman stated in a letter to the agricultural economist 
William Myers, “The principle interest in Chile at the moment appears to be in land reform.  
This, of course, is not a field in which we would wish to participate in actively.”10   
 The next year, however, RF officer Charles Hardin met with Solon Barraclough, head of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., and discussed the impending radical changes 
in Chilean agriculture.  Barraclough suggested that the U.N and other agencies should train 
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individuals “who will be able more sensibly and intelligently to take hold of the action programs 
that emerge.”11  As one possible solution to what Hardin noted as the “rise in tension in Latin 
America and the probable impending radical changes,” Baraclough and Hardin discussed John 
D. Black’s approach to land reform which was implemented with some success in Tennessee.12  
Though Black’s method was radical for its place and time, it fit within the ideological parameters 
of a capitalist system (i.e., it retained the fundamental belief in private property and 
individualism), and resulted in increased productivity.  It also offered a way to address the issue 
of land reform before radical change became inevitable.  Though critical of this approach and its 
application of it in the United States in 1953, Hardin thought its application in Chile could have 
positive results.
13
   
By 1970, the Rockefeller Foundation appeared to be paying more attention to issues 
beyond scientific technologies, including being concerned with increasing the income of small 
farmers (farmer’s income was a central focus of Black’s work), and “assisting them in 
participating in the market economy.”14  The RF also came to realize the interconnectedness of 
the agricultural issue with other social problems. They began to see social science research in the 
areas of population growth and economic policy as vital “to the process of continually increasing 
the productivity of the resources- human and other- in developing countries.”15  This “second 
phase of agricultural development” appears to be an attempt to address the failure of the Green 
Revolution to modernize Latin American economies through a primary focus on increased 
productivity. 
While more research is needed, these discussions of productivity and land reform reveal 
how initial assumptions about capitalist development collided with an important debate waging 
in Latin American countries about land tenure and social justice.  The extent to which the 
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Rockefeller Foundation was willing to engage these issues was affected at least partially by the 
leftward drift in politics, especially in Chile, where radical changes to agriculture were a real 
possibility.  With additional research and the synthesis of the RF information with material I 
found at the Ford Foundation archives, I hope to further flesh out the productivity/land reform 
dichotomy (perhaps not the dichotomy as it appeared to be in the 1950s) and how foundations 
operating in Latin America adjusted their programs to address this issue. 
 
University Development in the Social Sciences 
 The RF’s university development program reflected the influence of the modernization 
paradigm and its focus on training indigenous elites to carry out modernizing reforms in their 
respective countries.  The Rockefeller Foundation would select key institutions of higher 
learning in several countries and focus on building academic departments in the natural sciences 
and the social sciences based on the university system in the United States.  The goal in the 
social sciences was to create departments with full-time faculty whose focus was action-oriented 
research for use in public policy.   
 This process primarily consisted of funding visiting professors from U.S. universities to 
teach and train students and the use of fellowships for Latin Americans who wished to study at 
U.S. universities and return home to apply their knowledge to national problems.  Initially, the 
Rockefeller Foundation relied heavily on visiting professors from U.S. institutions.  Over time, 
however, this practice would meet with increasing resistance from students, as anti-American 
sentiments engulfed university campuses across Latin America.  The Director’s Statement on 
Programs in 1970 reflects one possible response to this resistance: 
In the early years of educational aid to developing countries, some experts 
thought that all that was needed was to transfer knowledge from the developed to 
the developing countries and to educate a sufficient number of people.  Today a 
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different approach is needed.  Indigenous problem-solving centers must be 
created in the local universities where existing knowledge can be adapted and new 
knowledge created while at the same time efforts are made to solve local 
problems and to educate future scientists and leaders.
16
   
 
The material on the RF’s support for the development of economics at University of the 
Andes (Colombia), University of the Valle (Colombia), University of Chile, and 
Universidad Católica (Chile) provides insight into the dynamics of university 
development in Latin America.  The RF preferred to work with established universities 
whose scholars could have significant impact on public policy.  The goal of university 
reform was not only to create a university system more like that in the United States, with 
full-time faculty who conducted research, but also to create a pool of technocrats who 
could utilize the latest research in the natural and social sciences to guide their countries’ 
development.  This strategy dictated that RF resources be directed toward elite 
institutions that served mostly the upper and middle classes.
17
  
 One of the more successful attempts at building the social sciences in Latin 
America was the RF’s involvement in the field of economics.18  Influencing the 
intellectuals in Latin America was important to RF goals and critical to addressing the 
growing anti-Americanism present in universities.
19
  Anti-American sentiments were 
particularly troublesome to RF goals of university reform at the University of the Andes 
and the University of the Valle. RF attempts to build strong departments of economics 
and political science with the use of visiting professors from the United States were 
meeting resistance from students.  New faculty appointments had to be approved not only 
by the university staff and administration, but also by the powerful student 
representatives, who rejected many appointments due to their U.S. training.  In 1964 
Charles Hardin was receiving reports that Valle was “fairly close to saturation point” in 
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terms of visiting professors from the United States.
20
  By 1966 Hardin warned that adding 
more Americans to Valle could “invite trouble.”21  
 While RF officials saw their role in building the social sciences in Latin America 
as an apolitical endeavor, many Latin Americans saw the visiting professors who came 
on foundation and government grants as part of a larger process of indoctrination by the 
United States.  This would be a constant challenge the Rockefeller Foundation had to 
face in the polarized political environment of the 1960s.  My initial, though incomplete, 
look at the project files on Brazil indicate similar problems in building research-oriented 
departments and institutions in the social sciences.
22
  Thus, by 1970 the RF’s emphasis 
(noted earlier) on building indigenous leadership and scholarship appears to be one 
response to this issue. 
 
Population Programs 
 Population growth in Latin America seemed to exacerbate many of the problems 
that RF grants and programs tried to solve, especially in agriculture.  Creating a “middle-
class revolution” that would benefit the majority of Latin Americans and de-radicalize 
politics depended heavily on keeping population growth in check.  The gains in 
agricultural productivity and economic growth were being undermined by explosive 
population growth. While this research trip only allowed a cursory look at the material on 
this topic, I will comment on the RF’s initial approach to the problem and its realization 
of the interrelatedness of population growth to other economic and social issues. 
 The Rockefeller Foundation began a specific program in population in 1963.  
Initially, the RF’s focus was on the biological aspects of population growth, i.e. scientific 
research on birth control and fertility.  Over the course of the 1960s, the obstacles toward 
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zero population growth led the RF to look to the social sciences for answers on how to 
achieve lower birth rates.  Medical breakthroughs in limiting fertility did not translate to 
lower population growth.  A 1970 Rockefeller Foundation report on population programs 
noted “attitudinal factors that limit acceptance by individuals and government leaders of 
family size and population restrictions” and “methods of communicating information on 
fertility limitation and population control to masses of poorly educated, economically 
disadvantaged people” as two major hurdles in RF programs aimed at lowering birth 
rates.
23
 To address the problem of social acceptance, the Rockefeller Foundation began 
funding local groups to conduct outreach programs on family planning.  One such 
organization, the Colombian Association for the Scientific Study of Population, 
conducted workshops on family planning in Colombia’s major cities.  More research will 
be needed to determine the changing vision for population control and the extent of 
acceptance of, or resistance to, the RF’s population programs within Latin American 
countries. 
Conclusion 
 The primary goal of my initial research trip was to get a broad overview of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s programs in Latin America, to begin to identify intellectual and 
ideological assumptions behind the programs, and to uncover any limitations of the RF’s 
approach.  In agriculture, my tentative thesis posits that the focus on productivity and the 
reluctance to engage the land reform issue was a product of assumptions about capitalist 
development and modernization that stemmed less from an understanding about Latin America 
and its problems than from the dominant paradigm influencing development ideas 
(modernization theory).   
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 Likewise, the elitist model of social and economic change that underscored the RF’s 
university development program reflected long-standing conceptions about development that had 
their roots in what Louis Hartz described as “the liberal tradition in America.”24 Further research 
to document the influence of modernization theory and the “liberal tradition” on RF programs is 
needed (though I did find references to several prominent modernization theorists in the material 
I looked at).  In addition, the extent to which RF officers were able to break free from their 
ideological assumptions is yet unclear.   
 My initial thoughts are that in agriculture radical reform from within Latin American 
countries was such a real possibility that it forced RF officers to reconsider their simplistic focus 
on increasing yield and engage the issue of land reform, albeit conservatively.  I will need to 
follow up on the projects in Chile based on John Black’s method (mentioned in discussions of 
land reform) to properly speak to this issue. In the area of university reform, the basic approach 
to training an elite cadre of researchers and technocrats was never really second guessed, even 
with growing anti-American sentiments in the universities.  Many projects, especially in the field 
of economics, were thought to be models for university development.  The documents I have 
looked at suggest that preconceived notions of development defined the parameters of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s programs, but the documents also reveal ways in which the RF  
adjusted their efforts in response to local environments.    
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